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COMMENT 
HOW FAR CAN A STATE GO TO 
PROTECT A FETUS? THE 
REBECCA CORNEAU STORY AND 
THE CASE FOR REQUIRING 
MASSACHUSETTS TO FOLLOW 
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution provides that a state shall not deprive any person of 
life, liberty or property without due process of law.1 The Re-
becca Comeau story illustrates the tremendous complexity at-
tached to those seemingly uncomplicated words, as well as the 
necessity that states abide by them. The Attleboro-Robidoux 
Sect is a fundamentalist Christian group that rejects medical 
treatment.2 Rebecca Comeau is a member of that sect, and in 
1999 she gave birth to a child, Jeremiah, who died in disputed 
circumstances.3 Jeremiah had not been born in a hospital. Ac-
cording to the Bristol County, Massachusetts District Attor-
ney, Jeremiah died because Corneau failed to aspirate the 
contents of the birth canal4 from his lungs.5 Despite this alle-
I See u.s. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
2 See Frank J. Murray, Pregnant Woman in Custody After Refusing Medical 
Exam, THE WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 1,2000, at A4. 
3 See e.g. The Early Show: Paul Walsh Jr., District Attorney, and Lynne Paltrow, 
Reproductive Rights Attorney, Discuss the Case of Rebecca Corneau, Member of a 
Christian Sect that Rejects Medical Care (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 1, 2000) 
(transcript on file with Burrelle's Inform(ltion Resources) [llereinafter Early Showl. 
4 Aspiration is a routine procedure generally performed by a doctor or midwife 
immediately following birth in which a clear airway is established. See VARNEY, VAR-
123 
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gation, Comeau insists that the child was stillbom.6 
At around the same time, another child in the sect also 
died.7 This child was a ten-month old boy who police believe 
starved to death.8 The bodies of both of these children were 
found buried in Baxter State Park in Maine.9 Massachusetts' 
prosecutors are currently investigating the circumstances sur-
rounding the deaths of both infants.Io Eight members of the 
sect, including Corneau's husband,11 have been jailed in Mas-
sachusetts for failing to cooperate with the investigation.12 Ad-
ditionally, Comeau was pronounced an unfit mother and her 
three living children were removed from her by the state.13 Al-
though a principal focus of the investigation of the Attleboro 
Sect concerns the death of Jeremiah, Corneau has not been 
charged with any crime.14 
In August of 2000, the state became aware that Corneau 
was pregnant with another child. 15 The court ordered that 
Comeau undergo a physical exam, which she refused to do. 16 
Due to the circumstances surrounding the death of Jeremiah, 
the state of Massachusetts feared for the safety of Comeau's 
unborn fetus and ordered her to remain in a state-run medi-
cal facility in Boston for the remainder of her pregnancyY 
While still in custody, Corneau gave birth to a healthy girl 
who the court ordered to remain in state-custody until her 
NEY's MIDWIFERY, 455-56 (3d ed. 1997). 
5 See Early Show, supra note 3. 
6 See David Abel, Pregnant Sect Member in State Custody, THE BOSTON GLOBE, 
Sept. I, 2000, at AI. 
7 See id. 
S See Angie Cannon, A Case of Fetal Rights, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 
25,2000. 
9 See Sect Member Leads Police to Buried Bodies of 2 Infants, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE, Oct. 25, 2000, at A9. 
10 See Abel, supra note 6. 
11 David Comeau told the police where the two infants were buried on October 
24, 2000, in exchange for immunity for himself and Rebecca Comeau. See Sect Mem-
ber Leads Police to Buried Bodies of 2 Infants, supra note 9. 
12 See Cannon, supra note 8. 
13 See CNN TALKBACK LIVE: How Far Can the State Go to Protect an Unborn 
Child? (CNN television broadcast, Sept. 4, 2000) [hereinafter TALKBACK]. 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See Abel, supra note 6. 
17 See Early Show, supra note 3. 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol31/iss2/2
2001] RIGHT TO PRNACY AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 125 
fate is decided by the courts.1S 
This comment will explore the question of whether a 
state can take a pregnant woman into custody and subject her 
to prenatal care despite her religious beliefs that prohibit her 
from seeking medical care. Part II of this comment explains 
the historical development of a woman's fundamental right to 
privacy in making decisions concerning her pregnancy. Part II 
also discusses the limited contexts in which a fetus has rights, 
a person's right to free exercise of religion, and a person's 
freedom to refuse medical care. Part III addresses the legal 
procedures by which a state may confine a person against her 
will and how this implicates a person's right to due process . 
. Part IV critiques the Massachusetts court's forced confine-
ment of Corneau. Part V discusses what a state should do 
when confronted with a pregnant woman who refuses medical 
care due to her religious belief that to receive medical care is 
to "bow to a false God."19 
II. BACKGROUND 
A woman's fundamental right to privacy in making deci-
sions concerning her pregnancy is relevant to Corneau's case 
because her case highlights the question of whether states 
have any right to intervene on behalf of an unborn fetus. 2o 
This section will also discuss the limited rights of a fetus. 21 
These rights have been articulated when states have at-
tempted to intervene in a woman's choices concerning her 
pregnancy.22 Several states have used these fetal rights to pro-
tect the fetus from harm caused by the behavior of the mother 
during pregnancy.23 Finally, the right to refuse medical care 
will be examined, as well as whether the right to free exercise 
of religion supports an individual in her refusal of medical 
care when this decision affects the life of her child.24 
18 See Sect Member Leads Police to Buried Bodies of 2 Infants, supra note 9. 
19 See Abel, supra note 6. 
20 See infra notes 49 and 61-62 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 100-01 and 112-113 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 169-177 and accompanying text. 
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A. A WOMAN'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN MAKING CHOICES ABOUT 
HER PREGNANCY 
An individual's right to privacy is not specifically enumer-
ated in the Bill of Rights.25 Although the framers of the Con-
stitution did not include the right to privacy in the text of the 
Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has found 
that a right to privacy does exist and is protected by the Con-
stitution.26 Since its determination in 1965, courts have ex-
panded this right to privacy and frequently invoke this right 
to protect myriad circumstances in our private lives.27 
In 1965, the United States Supreme Court first articu-
lated an individual's right to privacy.28 In Griswold v. Connect-
icut,29 the Court examined the right to privacy within the con-
text of a Connecticut criminal statute that outlawed the 
purchase and prescription of contraceptives. 30 The appellants 
were medical professionals who had been convicted of giving 
married couples information regarding contraception.31 The 
appellants had been found guilty as accessories under the 
Connecticut Statute and were fined pursuant to the statute's 
prohibition on using contraceptives or providing assistance in 
their use.32 Appellants challenged the constitutionality of the 
Connecticut statute claiming it violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.33 
The Court identified the issue to be whether the Connect-
icut statute violated a person's right to privacy in the context 
of the intimate relationship of marriage.34 The Court deter-
25 See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 28 and 35-36 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 44-50 and 56 and 171 and accompanying text. 
28 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
29 See id. 
30 See id. at 480 (providing that General Statutes of Connecticut § 53-32 states 
that "any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose 
of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not 
less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned." Sec-
tion 54-196 states that "any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or com-
mands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were 
the principal offender."). 
31 See id. 
32 See id. 
33 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480. 
34 Cf at id. at 482 (recognizing that the law forbidding the use of contraceptives 
4
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mined that although the right to privacy is not enumerated in 
the Bill of Rights, it is implicit in the First Amendment's 
guarantee of "freedom to associate and privacy in one's as-
sociations."35 Furthermore, protection of privacy could be 
found in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments' "protection 
against all governmental invasions of the sanctity of a man's 
home and the privacies of life."36 The Court found that deci-
sions regarding contraceptives fell within this scope of protec-
tion.37 From these protections, the Court concluded that a 
zone of privacy existed within the Constitution.38 Further-
more, a married person's decision to use contraceptives fell 
squarely within that zone of privacy.39 
Finding that the decision to use contraceptives was 
within the zone of privacy, the Court struck down the Con-
necticut statute and held that governmental intrusion into the 
marital bedroom to search for signs of contraceptive use is 
"repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marital 
relationship."40 Griswold was the Court's first clear articula-
tion of an individual's fundamental right to privacy.41 How-
ever, the right to privacy created therein was not unqualified. 
The Griswold Court limited the right of privacy to decisions 
and events that occur within the marital relationship.42 
A few years later in Eisenstadt v. Baird,43 the Court ex-
panded the Griswold right of privacy to unmarried people.44 
Appellee Baird, a professor, was convicted under a Massachu-
setts statute45 for giving contraceptive foam to an unmarried 
by married people "operates directly on an intimate relation"). 
35 See id. at 183 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958». 
36 See id. at 484 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886». 
37 See id. at 485 
36 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. 
39 C{. at id. 485-86 (stating that allowing police to search the marital bedroom for 
signs of contraceptive use is repulsive to notions of privacy surrounding marriage). 
40 See id. at 486. 
41 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
42 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486. 
43 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
44 See id. at 454. 
45 See id. at 440 (referring to Massachusetts General Laws Ann., c. 272 which 
mandates a maximum five-year term of imprisonment for any person who distributes 
contraceptives unless they are a registered medical professional prescribing contra-
ceptives to a married person). 
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woman at the conclusion of a lecture on contraception.46 In Ei-
senstadt, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, explained 
that under Griswold, a state may not prohibit the distribution 
of contraceptives to married persons.47 The Court stated that 
to ban the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons 
is equally impermissible, because to find otherwise would vio-
late the equal protection right of unmarried individuals.48 
Brennan proclaimed that "[if] the right of privacy means any-
thing, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be 
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters 
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether 
to bear or beget a child."49 Thus, the Court held that the Mas-
sachusetts statute was unconstitutional because it provided 
dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons. 50 
Eisenstadt was followed in 1973 by Roe v. Wade. 51 There, 
the United States Supreme Court determined whether the 
fundamental right to privacy, established in Griswold and ex-
panded by Eisenstadt, extended to a woman's choice to termi-
nate her pregnancy. 52 In Roe, a class action was brought chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the Texas criminal law that 
prohibited and criminalized abortion except in the event that 
it was needed to save the mother's life.53 Jane Roe, the named 
plaintiff, was unmarried, pregnant, and could not afford to 
travel to another state to obtain a "legal" abortion.54 Further, 
because her life was not in danger, Roe could not obtain an 
abortion in Texas and despite her desire to terminate her 
pregnancy, she was forced to carry the child to term. 55 
The Court determined that a woman's decision to termi-
nate her pregnancy falls within the right of privacy. 56 If a 
46 See id. 
47 See id at 453. 
48 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (citing the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
49 See id. at 453-54. 
M See id. at 454-55. 
61 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
62 See generally Roe, 410 U.S. at 113. 
63 See id. at 117-18 (discussing Texas Penal Code 1191-1194, and 1196). 
64 See id. at 120. 
66 Cf at 124-25 (explaining that Roe was not pregnant at the time of the district 
court hearing). 
66 See id. at 153. 
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state denies a woman this choice altogether, a detriment 
would be imposed upon her. 57 However, the Court stated that 
a woman's right to obtain an abortion is not absolute.58 In the 
context of abortion, the Court held that a state may properly 
exercise its important interests in safeguarding health, main-
taining medical standards, and in protecting potential life. 59 
However, these state interests must be weighed against a wo-
man's right to privacy in making decisions concerning her 
pregnancy.60 
In weighing these conflicting interests, the Court recog-
nized that where "fundamental"61 rights, such as the right to 
privacy, are involved, a state's intrusion into these rights 
must be justified by a "compelling" state interest.62 The state's 
compelling interest in protecting potential life required the 
Court to determine whether the fetus, a potential life, is a 
"person" deserving of Constitutional protection.63 The Court 
explained that because the Constitution does not specifically 
define what a "person" is,64 for the purposes of receiving con-
stitutional protection, a fetus is not considered a "person" 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.65 
While the Constitution does not provide protection to the 
unborn, the Supreme Court recognized in Roe that the state 
does have a legitimate interest in protecting potential life.66 
Furthermore, the Court differentiated Roe from privacy cases 
that involve the marital relationship, because a pregnant wo-
man is carrying a potential life in her uterus.67 For this rea-
57 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (stating, for example, that being forced by the state to 
mother an unwanted child could result in a distressful life, aggravated by the physi-
cal and psychological harm associated with overwork and the possible stigma of being 
an unwed mother). 
58 See id. 
59 See id at 154. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. at 152 (explaining that only personal rights that can be deemed funda-
mental are included in the idea of personal privacy). 
62 See e.g. Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) quoted 
in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155. 
63 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 158. 
64 See id. at 157 (explaining that although the word "person" is used in the Four-
teenth Amendment, it is used only to apply to those people already born). 
65 See id. at 158. 
66 See id. at 162. 
67 See id. at 159. 
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son the Court held that a woman's right to an abortion must 
be measured against the fact that a potential life is at stake.68 
Furthermore, the Court agreed that the state also has an in-
terest in preserving and protecting the health of pregnant wo-
men.69 Therefore, in order to reconcile these three distinct in-
terests, the Court determined that the state's interest in 
protecting potential life becomes compelling at the point of vi-
ability, that is when the fetus is "capable of sustaining life 
outside of the womb."70 Therefore, according to Roe, until the 
fetus reaches the point of viability, the state may not interfere 
with the mother's choice to terminate her pregnancy.71 Moreo-
ver, if the mother's health is at stake at any time during the 
pregnancy, saving her life overrides any interest the state 
may have in protecting the potential life of the fetus. 72 
In 1992, the Supreme Court narrowed Roe's holding in 
Planned Parenthood u. Casey. 73 The Casey Court recognized 
that the state has a compelling interest in potential life at the 
point of the fetus' viability.74 However, Justice O'Connor, in 
her majority opinion, found that the trimester demarcation, 
articulated in Roe, was no longer a sufficient basis for deter-
mining viability.75 Technological advancements in the years 
separating Roe and Casey rendered the Roe trimester system 
outdated.76 The Casey Court established a new approach to 
determining the point at which a state's interest in potential 
life becomes compelling.77 The test for this determination was 
whether the regulation in question creates an undue burden 
on a woman's right to privacy in making the decision whether 
to have an abortion.78 If the regulation does create such a bur-
den, then the regulation is unconstitutional. 79 
68 See Roe, 410 US. at 154. 
69 See id. at 162. 
70 See id. at 163. 
71 See id. at 164. 
72 See id. 
73 505 US. 833 (1992). 
74 See id. at 870. 
75 See id. at 873. 
76 See id. 
77 See id. at 874. 
78 See Casey, 505 US. at 874. 
79 See id. at 877. 
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While Roe and Casey limit a woman's right to privacy in 
making decisions concerning her pregnancy, these restrictions 
are limited to the context of obtaining an abortion. Although 
Casey departed from Roe in establishing how a state deter-
mines a fetus' viability for the purposes of the validity of state 
intrusion, the rights of the state and the rights of the preg-
nant woman remained the same.80 The state retains the right 
to prohibit a woman from having an abortion when the poten-
tially aborted fetus is viable.81 The state may also enact regu-
lations concerning abortion, provided the s~ate's interest is 
compelling and the regulations do not unduly burden the wo-
man's right to privacy.82 Nevertheless, women retain the right 
to privacy in making decisions concerning their pregnancy, in-
cluding the decision to have an abortion.83 
B. FETAL RIGHTS 
Although Roe and Casey layout the rights of the woman 
and the rights of the state in the context abortion, the Su-
preme Court has made no clear articulation of whether a fe-
tus has any constitutionally protected rights. In fact, by con-
cluding that a fetus is not a person under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court suggests that a fetus has no 
rights under the Constitution.84 Further, the Supreme Court 
has not specifically addressed the question of whether the 
rights of the state to protect a viable fetus extend into areas 
other than abortion.85 Without guidance on this issue states 
have attempted, often without success, to protect the viable 
fetus in contexts other than abortion. 86 
80 See id. at 874. 
81 See id. at 870. 
82 See id. at 874. 
83 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
84 See id. at 158. 
85 See Cynthia L. Glaze, Comment, Combating Prenatal Substance Abuse: The 
State's Current Approach and the Novel Approach of Court-Ordered Protective Cus-
tody of the Fetus, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 793, 796 (1997). 
88 See id. at 802 (finding by Florida Supreme Court that prosecuting pregnant 
women for prenatal substance abuse is the least effective means for combating the 
problem of drug use during pregnancy. Michigan courts finding positive drug urinal-
ysis in newborns not sufficient to constitute drug possession for the mothers). 
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The issue of fetal rights is particularly challenging when 
addressing whether the state has a compelling interest in pro-
tecting a viable fetus from a mother's conduct during her 
pregnancy.87 The state's compelling interest in protecting po-
tential life must be balanced against the mother's fundamen-
tal right to make decisions concerning her pregnancy.88 How-
ever, women's rights advocates argue that any rights afforded 
to a fetus should be limited to the context of abortion.89 As 
the fetus is not afforded any protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the mother has a fundamental right to 
make decisions concerning her pregnancy, states should be al-
lowed to intervene in a woman's pregnancy only where abor-
tion is concerned.90 
However, fetal rights advocates read Roe more broadly.91 
They believe that Roe stands for the proposition that the fetus 
has rights independent of the mother or the state, even before 
it becomes viable.92 Fetal rights advocates further urge that 
the existence of these rights were affirmed by the Court's de-
cision in Casey93 and are only limited by the balancing test.94 
They argue that these independent rights and the conditional 
rights already afforded to the fetus in other areas of the law 
justify a state's interest in the rights of the fetus in contexts 
other than abortion.95 For example, a fetus is entitled to re-
ceive an inheritance provided it is born alive.96 In tort law, 
every state provides a cause of action for prenatal injury, so 
long as the viable fetus is later born alive.97 In addition to 
these qualified rights, most states allow a tort cause of action 
for prenatal injury to a viable fetus even when the fetus dies 
87 See Nova D. Janssen, Note, Fetal Rights and the Prosecution of Women for Us-
ing Drugs During Pregnancy, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 741, 742 (2000). 
88 See Glaze, supra note 85, at 797. 
89 See id. at 796. 
90 See id. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. at 796. 
93 But see Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (stating that the trimester demarcation is in-
compatible with state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy, as opposed to 
articulating that a fetus has rights throughout the pregnancy). 
94 See Glaze, supra note 85, at 796-97. 
95 See id. at 797. 
96 See Janssen, supra note 87, at 750. 
97 See id. 
10
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prior to birth.98 Furthermore, in criminal law, some states al-
low a cause of action for fetal homicide if the fetus was viable 
at the time of the killing. 99 
Fetal rights advocates believe that these conditional 
rights, and the independent rights that they derive from the 
Court's decisions in Roe and Casey, justify a state's interven-
tion into a woman's pregnancy in contexts other than abor-
tion. loo Fetal rights advocates further believe that the state 
has an even greater interest in protecting the future life of 
the fetus should a mother choose to carry her pregnancy to 
term. lOl Since Casey was the last articulation by the Supreme 
Court on the issue, whether the position expressed by wo-
men's rights advocates or that expressed by fetal rights advo-
cates is the constitutionally supported position is still hotly 
contested. 
C. STATE INTERVENTION: WOMEN USING ILLEGAL DRUGS DURING 
PREGNANCY 
Outside of the abortion debate, a major arena in which 
states have attempted to create and protect rights for the fe-
tus, is that in which a pregnant woman uses illegal drugs 
duIjng her pregnancy.102 The use of illegal drugs by a mother 
can have a significant impact on the health of the fetus. lo3 For 
example, some of the effects of cocaine and heroin on a fetus 
are addiction and withdrawal at birth, low birth weight, short 
body length, abnormally small head circumference, birth de-
fects and learning disabilities. lo4 Many states have attempted 
to protect the fetus from these potential dangers by charging 
a mother who uses illegal drugs while pregnant with child 
abuse. lo5 
For example, in In Re Ruiz, the Ohio Court of Common 
Pleas addressed the question of whether a mother's prenatal 
98 See id. 
99 See Tony Hartsoe, Person or Thing: In Search of the Legal Status of a Fetus: A 
Survey of North Carolina Law, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 169. 211-12 (1995). 
100 See Glaze, supra note 85, at 796-97. 
101 See id. at 797. 
102 See id. at 793-94. 
103 See id. at 793. 
104 See id. 
105 See Glaze. supra note 85, at 799. 
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conduct constituted child abuse under Ohio's statute. lOG 
Luciano Ruiz was born mildly premature, underdeveloped, 
and with a host of health problems. lo7 At birth, he tested posi-
tive for cocaine and opiates. lOS The source of these traces of 
drugs could only be linked to Luciano's mother.109 
In order to determine whether Ruiz's mother could be 
charged with child abuse for her prenatal use of illegal drugs, 
the court first ascertained whether a fetus is a child for the 
purposes of finding child abuse. 1lO In determining whether a 
fetus is a child under the Ohio statute, the court noted that 
the common law typically afforded legal protection beginning 
only at birth.111 However, prior to Ruiz, Ohio courts had al-
lowed causes of action to be brought for wrongful death of a 
viable fetus. ll2 On this basis, the court concluded that an un-
born child is entitled to at least some legal protection when 
his life has been endangered by another. 113 
Additionally, the Ruiz court looked to the United States 
Supreme Court's holding in Roe, which provides that a state 
has a compelling interest in human life at the time of viabil-
ity.114 The judge, reluctant to decide whether a fetus should be 
awarded a "person's" rights at the time of viability, reasoned 
that this question was better left to legal scholars.ll5 However, 
for the purpose of determining if a viable fetus is a child 
under the child abuse statute, the court found that the protec-
tions created in Roe and the civil legal protection afforded to 
a fetus by Ohio common law led to the conclusion that the 
state has an interest in a child's welfare beginning at viabil-
106 See In Re Ruiz v. Court of Common Pleas of Wood County, 500 N.E.2d 935, 
936 (1986). 
107 See id. 
108 See id. 
109 See id. 
llO See id. 
111 See In Re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 936. 
112 See id. at 937 (quoting Jasinsky v. Potts, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950) (allowing 
causes of action for viable fetus born alive, but dying shortly thereafter), Werling v. 
Sandy, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (1985) (allowing cause of action for viable fetus that is later 
stillborn». 
ll3 See id. at 939. 
ll4 See id. at 938. 
115 See id. at 937-38. 
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ity.116 Therefore, the court concluded that Ohio's definition of 
child abuse could include prenatal injury caused by drugs con-
sUIiled by a pregnant woman past the point of her fetus' 
viability. 117 
However, in a later case, Ohio v. Grey, the Ohio Supreme 
Court took the opposite approach from the Ruiz decision.11s 
The court stated that words and phrases in Ohio statutes are 
to be construed according to the rules of grammar and com-
mon usage.119 Following this rule, one becomes a parent only 
when his or her child is born.12o It follows logically that a 
child becomes a "child" only when he or she is born.121 In look-
ing at the same statute that was at issue in Ruiz, the court 
found that nowhere had the legislature indicated that it had 
intended to include pregnant women in the statutory defini-
tion of the word "parent."122 The court further held that 
whether pregnant women have a legal duty to protect their 
fetuses is a question for the state legislature, not the courts. 123 
Therefore, since the legislature had not included the protec-
tion of fetuses in the Ohio child abuse statute, the court re-
fused to allow the state of Ohio to convict pregnant women of 
child abuse who had used drugs during their pregnancies.124 
State courts seldom address the question of whether a 
state's interest in protecting the life of a fetus is compelling 
enough to outweigh the mother's constitutionally protected 
right to privacy.125 When questions arise concerning state in-
tervention during pregnancy, most states have adopted the 
Ohio Supreme Court's approach to look solely at the language 
of the child abuse statute to determine if a fetus is included 
within its scope of protection. 126 Because state child abuse 
statutes often lack language specific to fetuses, most states 
will not convict pregnant women under their child abuse 
116 See In Re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 938. 
117 See id. at 939. 
118 See Ohio v. Gray, 584 N.E. 2d 710 (1992). 
119 See id. at 711 (citing OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1.42). 
120 See id. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. at 712. 
123 See Gray, 584 N.E. 2d at 713. 
124 See id. 
125 See Glaze, supra note 85, at 799. 
126 See id. at 801. 
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codes for using drugs during pregnancy.127 
Because states are unable to press charges against the 
mother under the child abuse statutes, some states have 
turned to other methods of protecting the fetus when the 
state is aware that the mother has been using illegal drugs 
throughout the pregnancy.128 For example, the state of Wiscon-
sin has attempted to protect drug-exposed fetuses by placing 
the pregnant woman in custody until she gives birth.129 How-
ever, Wisconsin's approach was ultimately unsuccessful. 
In Wisconsin v. Kruzicki l30 a pregnant mother tested posi-
tive for cocaine and other drugs numerous times during her 
pregnancy.131 The County of Waukesha filed a Children in 
Need of Health and Protective Services (hereinafter "CHIPS") 
petition with the Juvenile Court.132 The petition alleged that 
the fetus was in need of the state's protection because its 
"parent neglected, refused or was unable, for reasons other 
than poverty, to provide necessary care [ ... ] so as to seri-
ously endanger the physical health of the child."133 A CHIPS 
petition is usually filed on behalf of a child who is already 
born and, if granted, the child is placed in foster care for its 
protection.134 In order to use a CHIPS petition to protect a fe-
tus, the mother must be placed in custody. The mother in 
Kruzicki argued that a fetus is not a child under the Chil-
dren's Code.135 The juvenile court ruled against the mother 
and placed her in custody for the protection of the "child."136 
On appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the deci-
sion, finding that a viable fetus is a "child" under Wisconsin's 
code.137 Although the state was successful at holding the 
mother until term, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the 
127 See id. at 805. 
128 See id. at 806. 
129 See id. 
130 561 N.W.2d 729 (1997). 
131 See id. at 732. 
132 See id. 
133 See id. 
134 See Glaze, supra note 85, at 806. 
135 See id. at 808. 
136 See id. at 806 (quoting State ex reI Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 197 Wis. 2d 532, 
541 (1995)). 
137 See id. at 807 (quoting State ex reI Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 197 Wis. 2d 532, 
560 (1995)). 
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lower court's decision, finding that the term "child" as it was 
used in the relevant child abuse statutes, was too ambiguous 
to include a fetus within its meaning.13S 
While some state legislatures have passed laws stating 
that drug addiction in a newborn is evidence of child abuse,139 
attempts to pass legislation that deters a woman's prenatal il-
legal drug use while pregnant have mainly failed. 140 In fact, 
by allowing a pregnant woman to be prosecuted, the state's 
goal of protecting the fetus from the consequences of its 
mother's drug use is circumvented because it deters pregnant 
mothers from seeking out prenatal care. For example, rather 
than face possible prosecution for drug use, many women us-
ing illegal drugs while pregnant will simply avoid seeking 
medical or prenatal care.14l Furthermore, incarceration does 
not necessarily ensure health for the fetus since prisons often 
have inadequate health care.142 
D. A RIGHT TO PRACTICE ONE'S RELIGION VERSUS THE RIGHT TO 
REFUSE MEDICAL CARE 
Turning from the considerations of women's privacy 
rights in making choices concerning pregnancy, the right to 
freely exercise one's religion and to refuse medical care must 
also be explored. The First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution provides for free exercise of religion.143 The right 
of the individual to refuse medical care as a form of free exer-
cise of religion has been afforded some constitutional protec-
tion. The following section will discuss these issues. 
1. Right to Religious Freedom 
While the right to privacy is not specifically enumerated 
in the Bill of Rights, the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution specifically provides for the freedom of re-
ligion.144 This right, however, is not without some limita-
138 See Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d at 736. 
139 See Glaze, supra note 85, at 803-04. 
140 See id. at 804. 
141 See Johnson v. Florida, 602 So.2d 1288, 1295-96 (1992). 
142 See Glaze, supra note 85, at 804-05. 
143 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
144 See, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878). 
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tions.145 Reynolds v. United States146 is an early Supreme 
Court articulation of how far the right to free exercise of re-
ligion extends. 
In Reynolds, the United States Supreme Court analyzed 
whether a Congressional statute forbidding polygamy violated 
the First Amendment. 147 The Court distinguished Congress' 
authority to legislate religious beliefs from its authority to 
legislate religious acts. 148 The Court held that although Con-
gress may not legislate a person's religious beliefs, it may pro-
hibit acts that endanger the public.149 The plaintiffs in Reyn-
olds were members of the Mormon faith, in which polygamy 
was an accepted and encouraged doctrine.15o The Court found 
that the historical prohibition against polygamy is linked to 
marriage, a sacred institution in American society that is nec-
essarily intertwined with the concept of monogamy.151 Polyg-
amy, the Court held, is in direct conflict with monogamy and, 
therefore, endangers the institution of marriage.152 Thus, the 
Court held that the First Amendment guarantee of religious 
freedom did not include the right to practice polygamy. De-
spite the fact that polygamy was a religious act, it was 
banned because it endangered the best interests of the 
public. 153 
In contrast, over sixty years later, in Cantwell v. Connect-
icut, :54 the Court struck down a statute that prohibited solici-
tation without a license when a Jehovah's Witness was con-
victed under the statute.155 Although the Court affirmed the 
Reynolds holding, finding that religious acts can be regulated, 
it held that the restrictions placed upon those acts could not 
"unduly infringe" on the individual's freedom of religion.156 
The "unduly infringe" standard provided more protection of 
145 See id. at 166. 
146 98 US. 145 (1878). 
1(7 See id. 
14S See id. at 166. 
149 See id. 
150 See id. at 145. 
151 See Reynolds, 98 US. at 165-66. 
152 See id. 
153 See id. at 167. 
154 310 US. 296 (1940). 
155 See id. at 311. 
156 See id. at 304. 
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religious acts than the Reynolds decision, which articulated no 
standard of scrutiny.157 In Cantwell, the licensing official was 
authorized to make determinations as to what is a religious 
cause when granting or denying licenses.15s The Court held 
that a state may regulate the time, place and manner of solic-
itation only if it is for the purpose of protecting the best inter-
ests of the public.159 To condition the granting of a license for 
solicitation on an official's determination of what constitutes a 
religious cause placed a burden on the free exercise of relig-
ion.160 The Court held that this licensing scheme unduly in-
fringed on Cantwell's free exercise of religion and was there-
fore unconstitutional.161 
A few years later in Prince u. Massachusetts,162 the Court 
upheld a Massachusetts child labor law which prohibited chil-
dren from selling printed material on the street.163 Prince, a 
Jehovah's Witness, permitted her nine-year old niece, also a 
Jehovah's Witness, to sell "The Watch Tower" on the street. l64 
Prince argued that the statute violated the child's "God-given 
right and constitutional right to preach the gospel."165 The 
Court held that although a parent has a right to give his chil-
dren religious training and a child has a right to exercise his 
religion, these rights are not absolute when they threaten an 
important public interest.166 The Court held that the impor-
tant public interest in protecting children from the evils of 
child labor was more important than either a parent's right or 
a child's right to free exercise of religion.167 Forbidding chil-
157 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. 
158 See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 302. 
159 See id. at 306-07. 
160 See id. at 307. 
161 See id. at 306. 
162 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
163 See id. at 170. 
164 See id. at 162 (discussing the distribution of the "Watch Tower," an informa-
tional pamphlet published by the' Jehovah's Witnesses). 
165 See id. 
166 See id. at 166. Compare with Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) 
(upholding a parent's authority to provide religious schooling, and a child's right to 
receive it, against the state's requirement that children attend public schools). 
167 See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67 (articulating some of the areas in which a state 
could properly legislate, in the interest of protecting children, that would supersede 
both the rights of religion and the rights of parenthood. Interestingly, the Court 
stated that a parent cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for either 
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dren to sell "The Watch Tower" on the street did not unduly 
infringe on the rights of Prince or her niece to freely practice 
their religion. 168 
2. Refusal of Medical Care 
Although not specifically enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights, a competent person may generally refuse to undergo 
medical treatment, even if such treatment may prove to be 
life-saving.169 Courts at all levels have upheld this right with-
out elaborating on the reasoning behind it yo Courts have also 
consistently upheld a competent adult's refusal of medical 
care on the grounds that refusal to consent to medical care is 
encompassed in the individual's fundamental right to pri-
vacy.l7l In fact, courts consistently impose civil liability on 
those who perform medical treatment without the consent of a 
competent adult.172 As with other rights included under the 
purview of a right to privacy, such as the right to an abortion, 
a state must assert an important governmental interest when 
inflicting medical care on the person in question, for that indi-
vidual's right to refuse medical care to be legally 
overridden. 173 
Courts have also upheld a patient's right to refuse medi-
cal care on the grounds that medical care violates his or her 
himself or his child on religious grounds). 
168 See id. at 170. 
169 See 93 A.L.R.3d 67 (3a)(2000). See also Palm Springs General Hospital v. Mar-
tinez, Dade Co CC, Fla (1971) (upholding elderly patient's refusal to undergo blood 
transfusions and surgery, despite inevitable death, because Florida's interest in com-
pelling treatment was minimal). 
170 See id. 
171 See id. at (3c). See also Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (1978) (holding that 
an elderly man had a right to have mechanical respiration discontinued based upon 
the constitutional right to privacy). See also Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978) 
(holding that a woman's constitutional right to privacy entitled her to refuse to con-
sent to having her gangrenous leg amputated). 
172 See id. at (3b). 
173 See id. See also Wons v. Public Health Trust, 500 So. 2d 679 (1987) (holding 
that trial court erred in authorizing hospital to administer involuntary blood transfu-
sions to a Jehovah's Witness where the State had no compelling interest sufficient to 
override the patient's constitutional right to practice her religion according to her 
conscience). For example, a state may assert an interest in preventing an adult from 
refusing medical care when the adult has dependent, minor children and receipt of 
medical care would prevent the children from becoming orphans. 
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religious beliefs.174 However, as with the right to privacy, a 
compelling governmental interest may allow the state to limit 
the right to free exercise of religion because the right to re-
fuse medical care is fundamental, but not absolute.175 States 
have successfully asserted a compelling governmental interest 
in saving the life of a viable fetus, thereby requiring medical 
procedures even though the pregnant woman refuses the pro-
cedures on religious grounds.176 Courts have also permitted 
states to assert this interest when forcing pregnant women 
into medical confinement when these women have previously 
refused medical treatment that would prevent the death of 
their fetuses. 177 
In Jefferson u. Griffin Spalding Hospital Authority,178 the 
Georgia Supreme Court forced a pregnant woman to undergo 
a surgical procedure that could save the life of her child over 
her religion based objection to surgery.179 Without the surgery, 
doctors predicted that the child had a one percent chance of 
surviving the birth, the mother a fifty percent chance. 18o With 
the surgery, both the mother and child had nearly a one-
hundred percent chance of survival.181 Despite the fact that 
the mother refused surgery on religious grounds, the court 
held that the state had an interest in the potential life of the 
viable fetus. The state further argued that its intrusion into 
the woman's right to privacy was outweighed by its duty to 
give the fetus an opportunity to live.182 As a result, the state 
forced the mother to undergo the surgery. 183 
174 See 93 A.L.R.3d 67 (3d). See also id. at (3b). See also Wons v. Public Health 
Trust, 500 So. 2d 679 (1987) (holding that trial court erred in authorizing hospital to 
administer involuntary blood transfusions to a Jehovah's Witness over her religious 
objections). 
175 See id. at (3d). See also Wons v. Public Health Trust, 500 So. 2d 679 (1987) 
(holding that trial court erred in authorizing hospital to administer involuntary blood 
transfusions to a Jehovah's Witness where state had no compelling interest sufficient 
to override patient's constitutional right to practice her religion according to her 
conscience). 
176 See Glaze, supra note 85, at 812. 
177 See id. at 812-13. 
178 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981). 
179 See id. 
180 See id. at 458. 
181 See id. 
182 See id. at 460. 
183 See Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 460. 
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In his concurring opinion, one Justice stated that al-
though the First Amendment grants absolute freedom of relig-
ious belief, it does not grant absolute freedom of religious 
acts. 1S4 However, when restricting a religious act, the state 
must take the least burdensome path possible.ls5 Even in tak-
ing the least burdensome path, a state still must demonstrate 
a compelling interest.1SG Protecting the life of a viable fetus 
and its mother are both compelling state interests.1S7 In this 
case, there was no less burdensome path than forcing the 
mother to undergo surgery.1SS Under these extreme circum-
stances, forcing the mother to undergo surgery against her re-
ligious beliefs was not a violation of the First Amendment.1S9 
The Jefferson court held that the state of Georgia demon-
strated a compelling interest in requiring the mother to un-
dergo surgery because both her life and that of her fetus were 
in serious danger.19o However, when faced with a situation 
similar to that in Jefferson, other courts have ruled differ-
ently.l9l For example, the Illinois Appellate Court. overruled 
the trial court's ruling that a pregnant woman be required to 
undergo blood transfusions for the benefit of her viable fetus, 
a procedure she refused to undergo on religious grounds.192 
The court held that the refusal of medical care in such an in-
stance outweighed the state's interest in the welfare of the vi-
able fetus, even though both the fetus and the mother were 
likely to die without the blood transfusions.193 
Protecting a viable fetus from imminent death, even 
outside of the abortion context, has been held to be a compel-
ling state interest.194 However, the contention that this inter-
184 See id. at 461 (Smith, J., concurring). 
185 See id. (Smith, J., concurring). 
188 See id. (Smith, J., concurring). 
187 See id. (Smith, J., concurring). 
188 See Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 461 (Smith, J., concurring). 
189 See id. (Smith, J., concurring). 
190 See id. at 460. 
191 See ego In Re Brown, 294 Ill. App. 3d 159, 172 (1997) (holding that a woman's 
right to refuse blood transfusions that would benefit her fetus outweighs State's in-
terest in the welfare of the viable fetus). 
192 See id. at 171. 
193 See generally id. at 172. 
194 See generally Anderson, 42 NJ at 423 (stating that an unborn child is entitled 
to the law's protection and the mother should receive blood transfusions because 
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est is compelling has not been echoed by, nor has it been ar-
ticulated by the United States Supreme Court. By contrast, 
when only the "welfare" of the fetus is at stake, such as when 
a mother is using drugs while pregnant, or where a fetus 
would be benefit from a medical procedure that is not neces-
sarily life preserving, the state is less likely to have a compel-
ling enough interest to override fundamental individual 
rights. 195 
III. DISCUSSION 
A Massachusetts judge ordered Rebecca Corneau to un-
dergo a prenatal exam because she was suspected of covering 
up the circumstances surrounding the death of her last baby, 
Jeremiah.196 Because of Jeremiah's death, the state feared for 
the safety of Comeau's fetus. 197 Comeau refused to submit to 
a court-ordered physical exam giving as her reason that to re-
ceive medical care is to "bow down to a false god."198 Upon her 
refusal, Corneau was taken into custody for failure to obey 
the court order.199 Corneau was then confined in the Neil J. 
Houston House, a medical facility in Roxbury, Massachusetts, 
and forced to remain there for the duration of her preg-
nancy.200 This decision may have been the first time a healthy 
woman had been forced into the state's custody to protect the 
health and welfare of an unbom child.201 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a person shall 
not be deprived of his liberty without due process of law.202 
There are two major ways in which a state may deprive a per-
son of his or her liberty, without a criminal conviction, and 
remain consistent with this constitutional mandate: preven-
tive detention and civil commitment. Massachusetts' forced 
confinement of Comeau presents several constitutional ques-
their lives are intertwined). 
195 See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text. 
196 See supra notes 3-13 and accompanying text. 
197 See Jacob H. Fries, Court Action Planned Against a Cult Member, THE BOSTON 
GLOBE, Aug. 31, 2000, at B2. 
198 See Abel, supra note 6. 
199 See id. 
200 See id. 
201 See id. 
202 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. 
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tions, each concern the right to liberty provided for in the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. First, Massachu-
setts exercised preventive detention over Corneau although 
she is not a criminal defendant. 203 Second, Massachusetts 
placed Corne au in civil commitment although she is not in-
competent,204 nor has she been proven to be a risk either to 
herself or another person.205 This section will discuss these 
issues. 
A. THE PREVENTIVE DETENTION DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICABIL-
ITY TO REBECCA CORNEAU 
A state may confine a criminal defendant, prior to trial 
and without bail, if it fears that the defendant is dangerous to 
the public at large, or to a certain segment of the public.206 
This practice is called the preventive detention doctrine.207 
The preventive detention doctrine raises the issue of whether 
pretrial freedom can be denied to a criminal defendant be-
cause of his suspected criminal tendencies.208 The main objec-
tion to this doctrine is that the deprivation of a defendant's 
freedom prior to finding him or her guilty is a denial of the 
defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.209 However, the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 allows 
preventive detention when there is evidence of past 
criminality. 210 
In United States v. Salerno211 the United States Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Federal Bail Reform 
Act of 1984.212 The Court stated that to exercise preventive 
detention, the state must have a legitimate and compelling 
regulatory interest in protecting the public that outweighs an 
:zoo See infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text. 
204 See infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text. 
205 See infra notes 235-36 and accompanying text. 
206 See 75 A.L.R. 3d 956 (2a) (1977). 
207 See id. 
208 See id. at (1). 
209 See Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure' of Interest-
Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 557 (1986). 
210 See, JOSHUA DRESSER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 549-52 (2d ed. 
1996). 
211 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
212 See id. at 754. 
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individual's liberty interest.213 In order to show that the inter-
est is compelling, the government must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the arrestee "presents an identified 
and articulable threat to an individual or the community."214 If 
this threat is demonstrated, then detention is consistent with 
the Due Process Clause.215 
However, application of the preventive detention doctrine 
requires that the person confined is a criminal defendant.216 
Although eight members of Comeau's religious group, includ-
ing Comeau's husband, have been placed in custody for refus-
ing to answer questions about the two infants' deaths, 
Comeau was not one of them.217 Comeau was, in fact, never 
arrested, nor was she charged with any crime prior to her 
forced medical confinement.218 Therefore, whether Massachu-
setts has the authority to hold Comeau in preventive deten-
tion is an issue that requires resolution. 
B. CIVIL COMMITMENT 
Preventive detention is a criminal procedure, and as such 
can only be applied apropos criminal defendants.219 However, 
outside of the criminal context, the state may institute civil 
confinement for persons who present a danger to themselves 
or others.220 This procedure is called civil commitment and re-
sults in confinement in a state mental hospital for varying 
lengths of time.221 Although the Massachusetts legislature 
provides for the civil commitment of mentally incompetent 
people, absent a finding of incompetence, the law requires 
that the person confined manifest a likelihood of serious harm 
to either himself or another person.222 In order to demonstrate 
that a person is a danger to himself, the state must establish 
evidence of threats or attempts of suicide or other significant 
213 See id. at 749-750. 
214 See id. at 75l. 
215 See id. 
216 See 75 A.L.R. 3d 956 §2(a). 
217 See Abel, supra note 6. 
218 See TALKBACK, supra note 13. 
219 See 75 A.L.R. 3d 956 (1977) §2(a). 
220 See infra notes 232-35 and accompanying text. 
221 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 419-20 (1979). 
222 See Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 123, §12a (2000). 
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bodily harm.223 Likewise, in order to show that the person is a 
danger to others, the state must establish evidence of homici-
dal or other violent behavior, or evidence that others are in 
reasonable fear of such behavior.224 . 
Similar to the preventive detention doctrine, civil commit-
ment raises the issue of whether the involuntary confinement 
of a person by the state violates his due process rights under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.225 A person forced into confine-
ment under civil commitment is necessarily deprived of his 
liberty. In most civil actions, where a person's liberty is not at 
stake, there must be a showing that what is being contended 
is more likely than not to have occurred.226 This standard of 
proof is known as the "preponderance of the evidence."227 How-
ever, in circumstances of civil commitment, the Constitution 
requires that the burden of proof be more rigorous because 
one's liberty is at stake.228 
In Addington v. Texas229 the United States Supreme Court 
addressed this problem. Although a state has a legitimate in-
terest in protecting the public from physical harm, the Court 
found that the standard civil action burden of proof, prepon-
derance of the evidence, is insufficient when it may result in 
the deprivation of a person's liberty.230 The Court held that 
when a state deprives a person of liberty through civil com-
mitment, the state must prove the necessity to do so by at 
least clear and convincing evidence.231 As a result, this higher 
standard of proof places a more stringent burden upon states 
to show that a person presents a danger to himself or others, 
and should be confined. 
As a preliminary matter, Massachusetts' civil commit-
ment statutes mandate that a person be incompetent before 
223 See id. at § l. 
224 See id. at §l. 
225 See Addington, 441 U.S. 418, 420 (1979). 
226 See generally id. at 423 (reasoning that as society has minimal concerns in 
the outcome of private monetary suits the preponderance of the evidence standard is 
all that is required). 
227 See id. 
228 See id. at 427. 
229 See id. at 418 . 
. 230 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 427. 
231 See id. at 433. 
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he or she can be placed in state custody.232 For one to be de-
clared incompetent, he or she must lack sufficient physical, 
mental or legal qualifications.233 The state has not declared 
Comeau to be incompetent, yet it has placed her in a state 
hospital. 234 Without a showing of incompetence, application of 
civil commitment requires a showing by clear and convincing 
evidence that the person is likely to harm himself or others.235 
As a result, Comeau should not be confined under this stat-
ute. Furthermore, since a fetus is not a person under the 
Fourteenth Amendment,236 and the Massachusetts civil com-
mitment law does not include a fetus in its definition of per-
son,237 whether Massachusetts has the authority to place 
Comeau in confinement under its civil commitment laws re-
quires an answer. 
IV. CRITIQUE 
Rebecca Comeau was confined by the state of Massachu-
setts against her will because she was pregnant and refused 
to submit to medical care.238 Corneau states that she refused 
this care because it was prohibited by her religion.239 Massa-
chusetts placed Comeau in custody due to some unsubstanti-
ated future harm it feared she would impose on her fetus, yet 
failed to charge her with a crime, deem her incompetent, or 
demonstrate that her fetus was in ill health. This state's ac-
tion and its reasoning is extremely questionable, in light of 
the fact that the Supreme Court has held that a fetus is nota 
person under the Fourteenth Amendment,240 and that most 
states refuse to protect fetuses even from the grave effects of 
prenatal drug exposure.241 
Most states remain reluctant to articulate fundamental 
rights for fetuses, even at the expense of protecting the fetus 
232 See Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 123, §4. 
233 See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY (6th ed.1991). 
234 See Abel, supra note 6. 
235 See Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 123, §l. See also Addington, 441 US. at 427. 
236 See Roe, 410 US. at 158. 
237 See Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 123, § 1 
238 See Cannon, supra note 8. 
239 See id. 
240 See Roe, 410 US. at 158. 
241 See Glaze, supra note 85, at 799. 
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from the detrimental health effects of exposure of prenatal 
drug exposure.242 States' reluctance to do so is consistent with 
the Supreme Court's holding in Roe that a fetus is not a per-
son under the Fourteenth Amendment.243 This conclusion is 
crucial to the Corneau situation because Massachusetts 
placed the supposed rights of a fetus, which is not a person 
deserving of constitutional protections,244 above the rights of 
Corneau, a person who is entitled to constitutional· protec-
tions.245 As a result, Comeau's rights to due process, privacy, 
and free exercise of religion were blatantly violated for no 
compelling reason.246 
A. CORNEAU'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WAS VIOLATED 
Holding Corneau in confinement for an entire month 
without charging her with a crime, violated her due process 
rights. Preventive detention is permissible only for criminal 
defendants.247 Furthermore, civil commitment is appropriate 
only when a person is declared incompetent or the state 
shows by clear and convincing evidence that if the person is 
not put in confinement, a great likelihood exists that he will 
endanger himself or others. The state of Massachusetts lacked 
a basis to confine Corneau under either of these procedures 
therefore her medical confinement was unconstitutional.248 
1. Preventive Detention Does Not Apply to Corneau 
Implicit in the preventive detention doctrine is that the 
person confined is a criminal defendant.249 Comeau was never 
arrested or charged with any crime on which to base a pre-
ventive detention.250 Furthermore, in order for a state to hold 
a person in custody without bail and without making a find-
ing of guilt, it must prove by clear and convincing evidence 
242 See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text. 
243 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 158. 
244 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
245 See infra notes 255-58 and accompanying text. 
246 See supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text. 
247 See 75 A.L.R. 3d 956 §2(a). 
248 See infra notes 249-51 and 253-54 and accompanying text. 
249 See 75 A.L.R. 3d 956 §2(a). 
250 See TALKBACK, supra note 13. 
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that the person presents an "identifiable and articulable 
threat to an individual or the community."251 The state of 
Massachusetts has not indicated that Comeau presents such 
a threat. It has not arrested or charged her with any crime. 
As a result, Corneau is not a criminal defendant and should 
not have been placed under preventive detention. 
Had Corneau been arrested on contempt charges, the 
state may have had legal support for holding Comeau in cus-
tody. Her pregnancy and birth could have been easily moni-
tored because she would be in jail,252 However, by simply plac-
ing Corneau in "medical confinement," without charging her 
with a crime and without showing by clear and convincing ev-
idence that she posed a threat to the public, Corneau's due 
process right to liberty, protected by the Fourteenth Amende-
ment, was violated. 
2. Civil Commitment Does Not Apply to Corneau 
The state of Massachusetts further violated Corneau's 
right to due process because she did not fit the criteria to be 
civilly committed. A civil commitment requires that the state 
show by clear and convincing evidence that the person is in-
competent or a serious threat to herself or others.253 The state 
never declared Corneau to be incompetent. Further, because 
Corneau's fetus is not a person deserving of protection under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Massachusetts civil com-
mitment statute did not include fetus in those subject to the 
likelihood of harm, her refusal to submit to prenatal care does 
not pose a serious harm to another person.254 Therefore, by 
placing Corneau in civil confinement, the state of Massachu-
setts deprived her of her right to liberty under the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
251 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751. 
252 See TALKBACK, supra note 13. 
253 See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text. 
254 See Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 123, §1. See also supra notes 64-65 and accompany-
ing text. 
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B. CORNEAU'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN MAKING DECISIONS CON-
CERNING HER PREGNANCY WAS VIOLATED 
Massachusetts wrongfully forced Corneau into confine-
ment for refusing to undergo a prenatal exam.255 Individuals 
have a fundamental right to make decisions concerning their 
pregnancy in private.256 In order for a state to infringe upon 
this fundamental right to privacy, it must show a compelling 
governmental reason for doing SO.257 Because the state had no 
evidence that Comeau or her fetus were anything but healthy 
when she was forced into medical custody, Massachusetts 
lacked a compelling reason to force her to have a prenatal 
exam.258 As a result, Massachusetts violated Comeau's right 
to privacy. 
The Supreme Court's decisions in Roe and Casey support 
the proposition that a state's compelling interest in protecting 
potential life applies only when a woman plans to terminate 
her pregnancy when her fetus is viable.259 In Casey, the Su-
preme Court narrowed Roe by changing the trimester method 
of determining when a fetus is viable, thereby expanding a 
state's compelling interest in protecting potentiallife.260 Under 
. Casey, the test became whether a regulation unduly infringes 
on a woman's right to make decisions concerning her preg-
nancy.261 This new test did not, however, change the interests 
at stake. The interests remained that a woman has a funda-
mental right to privacy in deciding whether to have an abor-
tion, limited only by a state's compelling interest in protecting 
the potential life of a viable fetus. 262 
Furthermore, in addressing whether particular legislation 
would unduly infringe on a woman's fundamental right to pri-
vacy, the Court only addressed regulations specifically related 
to abortion.263 The fact that the Court did not articulate the 
255 See TALKBACK, supra note 13. 
256 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. 
~7 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
~8 See TALKBACK, supra note 13. 
~9 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. 
260 See id. at 870. 
261 See id. at 874. 
262 See id. at 879. 
263 See id. at 879-901 (examining whether requiring a 24 hour waiting period 
before receiving an abortion, parental notification for pregnant minors seeking abor-
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possibility that a state could have a compelling interest in 
protecting potential life outside of the abortion context, sug-
gests that the Court did not intend for a state to assert that 
interest. 
However, even if the reasoning in Casey is extended to 
contexts other than abortion, the state of Massachusetts still 
lacked a compelling interest to violate Comeau's right to pri-
vacy. In asserting an interest in potential life, a state must 
not unduly infringe on a woman's right to privacy in making 
these decisions.264 By placing Corneau in confinement, the 
state rendered it impossible for her to make and carry out de-
cisions concerning her pregnancy. 
If allowed to assert fetal rights, a state could easily find 
that a woman who drank a beer, smoked a cigarette, or didn't 
wear a seat belt while pregnant should be locked up under 
the justification that her behavior put the fetus' life at risk. 265 
Accordingly, if women were forced to submit to prenatal ex-
ams, a huge burden would be placed on those women who 
cannot afford prenatal care, do not have access to it, or do not 
believe in it. 266 
Furthermore, allowing states to confine pregnant women 
suspected of past crimes could extend to allowing states to 
confine pregnant women who have actually committed past 
crimes. The problem then arises as to what types of convic-
tions would require the confinement of pregnant women. This 
type of control over a pregnant woman's life would grant the 
state unfettered permission to infringe on her privacy. To al-
low such intrusion is impermissible and arbitrary, and yet it 
is the precedent that is being set by allowing Massachusetts 
to confine Rebecca Comeau for her refusal to consent to pre-
natal care. 
tions, and spousal consent for woman seeking abortions unduly burdened a woman's 
right to choose}. 
264 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874. 
266 See TALKBACK, supra note 13. 
266 See id. 
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C. CORNEAU'S RIGHT TO FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION WAS 
VIOLATED 
The right to freely exercise one's religion is fundamen-
tal.267 However, if a state has a compelling governmental in-
terest in protecting the public, it may infringe or limit an in-
dividual's free exercise right. 268 Corneau asserts that refusing 
to submit to a prenatal exam is within her rights because to 
submit to medical care violates her religious beliefs.269 Al-
though a competent adult may generally refuse to submit to 
medical care without recriminations, the state imposed a dif-
ferent standard for pregnant women.270 States have required 
pregnant women to undergo medical procedures. However, 
Massachusetts' action to confine Corneau when the fetus was 
in no danger of ill health is unprecedented. 
The American Medical Association Board of Trustees 
stated that judicial intervention, to order medical care for 
pregnant women is appropriate only if an exceptional circum-
stance is found in which "treatment (1) poses an insignificant-
or - no health risk to the woman, (2) entails minimal invasion 
of her bodily integrity, and (3) would clearly prevent substan-
tial and irreversible harm to her fetus . . . "271 Forcing 
Corneau to submit to prenatal care posed no significant 
health risk to her. However, whether it prevented substantial 
and irreversible harm to her fetus is unclear. Therefore the 
standard was not met. Furthermore, forcing Corneau into con-
finement until she comes to term substantially invades her 
bodily integrity. Such confinement constitutes a maximum in-
vasion because it hinders both her movement and her deci-
sion-making abilities. It hinders her freedom. Furthermore, 
because there has been no showing that Corneau's fetus is in 
grave danger of death by her not receiving medical care, to 
force her to do so anyway infringes on her right to live accord-
ing to her religious convictions.272 Absent a compelling govern-
mental reason, a state may not unduly infringe on a person's 
267 See Prince, 321 U.S. at 165. 
268 See id. at 166. 
269 See Cannon, supra note 8. 
270 See 93 A.L.R.3d 67 §3a. 
271 See Glaze, supra note 85, at 814. 
272 See Wons, 500 So. 2d 679. 
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right to religious freedom. This interest has not been demon-
strated by Massachusetts, and Corneau's rights have been 
violated. 
V. PROPOSAL 
Despite the fact that Massachusetts acted in violation of 
Comeau's constitutional rights in forcing her into custody, a 
state should be permitted to protect the health and welfare of 
the unborn. The dilemma is how to protect a future life with-
out granting rights to a fetus to which it is not entitled, while 
respecting all of the rights of the mother. The state has an in-
terest in Corneau's situation, because it is aware of two in-
fants' deaths, one of whom was Comeau's son. Furthermore, 
Comeau's religious group refused to cooperate in the state's 
investigation into the infants' deaths, and Corneau was un-
likely to have her next child in a hospital, or seek out any fur-
ther medical care for that child. However, to allow the state 
to confine an individual on unsubstantiated suspicions results 
in a whittling away of the very concepts which the Constitu-
tion was written to protect: freedoms such as liberty, privacy, 
and the free exercise of religion. 
A state in Massachusetts' position must simply comply 
with the Constitution. The state must show a compelling in-
terest in order to infringe on a woman's right to privacy in 
making decisions concerning her pregnancy, and her right to 
freely exercise her religion by refusing medical care. If the in-
terest is not compelling, state action infringes on these rights. 
Although to refrain from taking action in such a circumstance 
may result in harm to a fetus, violating the fundamental con-
stitutional rights is disastrous in the long run. If the state 
may confine a pregnant woman merely suspected of poten-
tially harming her fetus, the state has unbridled power to 
control almost every aspect of a woman's life during her preg-
nancy. The Constitution is meant to prevent such unbridled 
governmental power and should be followed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Rebecca Comeau should not have been placed in the cus-
tody of the state of Massachusetts. The state failed to demon-
strate the requisite clear and convincing evidence needed to 
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confine her either under the preventive detention doctrine or 
under its civil commitment statute. Furthermore, because a 
fetus is not a person under the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
state may not remain consistent with the Constitution and in-
fringe on Corneau's right to make decisions concerning her 
pregnancy, including the decision not to have prenatal care. 
Because Corneau and her fetus were not in ill health, the 
state did not have a compelling reason to force her to submit 
to medical care. Furthermore, forcing Corneau into confine-
ment for refusing medical care on religious grounds is not the 
least burdensome method of protecting life and unduly in-
fringed on her right to free exercise of religion. The forced 
confinement of Rebecca Corneau was a flagrant violation of 
many of her constitutionally protected rights and should not 
be permitted to happen again in Massachusetts or any other 
state in the United States. 
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